This paper compares the level of uncertainty widely reported in climate change scientific publications with the level of uncertainty of the costs estimates of implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the United States. It argues that these two categories of uncertainties were used and ignored, respectively, in the policy making process in the US so as to challenge the scientific basis on the one hand and on the other hand to assert that reducing emissions would hurt the economy by an amount stated without any qualification. The paper reviews the range of costs estimates published since 1998 on implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the US. It comments on the significance of these cost estimates and identifies a decreasing trend in the successive estimates. This implies that initially some of the most influential economic model-based assessments seem to have overestimated the costs, an overestimation that may have played a significant role in the US decision to withdraw from the Protocol. The paper concludes with advocating that future economic estimates always include uncertainty ranges, so as to be in line with a basic transparency practice prevailing in climate science.
Introduction and Plan of the Paper
On the eve of the 2005 G-8 Summit in Gleneagles, the President G.W Bush seems to have admitted -13 years after his father, who signed and got ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC) -that the scientific basis of climate change was sound and that it is time for some action. Besides downplaying scientific assessments during five years on grounds of remaining large uncertainties, the US federal administration hampered the political process towards the Kyoto Protocol ratification on grounds of economic analysis results. The rationale behind the US stance can be summarized as follows: 1) Developing countries are not assigned targets in the Kyoto Protocol; this puts the US economy at a disadvantage as compared to competitors from developing countries, especially China, India and Brazil.
2) The domestic economic impact of implementing, by 2012, the 7% reduction of emissions relative to 1990 emission level required by the Kyoto Protocol is too costly for the US economy.
Notwithstanding the rationale for the exemption given to developing countries at this stage of the process 2 , it is surprising that those who argued for years that uncertainties about the science of climate change were a good reason for delaying action did not refer to any uncertainties that might conceivably affect the economic assessment underlying the above mentioned positions.
The White House and the Kyoto Protocol: Double standards on uncertainties and their consequences This paper compares, in Sections 2 and 3, the orders of magnitude of these two kinds of uncertainties: those dealt with in the scientific assessment of projected global temperature change and those associated with the cost assessments of implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the US. While such comparison deals with variables of totally different nature (global temperature vs emissions reduction costs) and relating to different time scales (100 years vs 10 years, respectively) the comparison is nevertheless logically feasible, as we shall show. It is also instructive if only to reiterate the importance of rendering explicit, in the policy making process, the levels of uncertainty associated with model-based projections in both climate physics and economics.
In Section 4, we discuss various aspects of the cost estimates of greenhouse gas emission reductions, and offer some suggestions as to how the estimates should be communicated. In Section 5, the paper reviews the published range, since 1998, of costs estimates of implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the US. It identifies a trend showing that initially, the economic model-based assessments have overestimated these costs and that such overestimation played a significant role in the US decision to withdraw from the Protocol. In section 6 we conclude with further suggesting that the cost of implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the US be reassessed on the basis of updated models and data, and that the associated uncertainties be made public.
The range of scientific uncertainties
The IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001a) indicates that for an emission path consistent with a stabilisation level of 550 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (B1 family of emission scenarios), the Earth global temperature rise in 2100 would be ranging from about 1.4°C to 2.6°C 3 relative to 1961-1990 mean observations. For emissions scenarios with larger emissions (A1FI family of scenario), the Report indicates results that range from 3.3°C to 5.6°C 4 (cfr. Figure 1 and Table 1 ). These estimates of uncertainties on global temperature change illustrate differences in results obtained with alternative climate models for given GHG concentrations. When these model-based uncertainties are combined with the uncertainties on emission scenarios, the range of simulated global temperature changes for all IPCC-SRES (2000) scenarios is estimated to be from 1.5°C to 5.8°C 5 for the year 2100. The IPCC (2001a) report did not specify any likelihood considerations on these estimates. This range turned out to revise the top-range value which was previously 3.5°C in IPCC Second Assessment Report. Schneider (2001) and Reilly et al. (2001) argued that the absence of any probability assignment would lead to confusion, as users select arbitrary scenarios or assume equiprobability. As a remedy, Reilly et al. estimated Reilly et al. (2001) and Wigley and Raper (2001) .
In previous IPCC assessment reports, projections for global average temperature by 2100, have been estimated from 1°C to 5°C 6 in the First Assessment Report (IPCC, 1990) and from 1 to 3.5°C in the Second Assessment Report (IPCC, 1995) . The uncertainty estimates are given in Tables 2 and 3 in terms of total cost and of percentage of GDP loss respectively 9 . Accounting for the full set of projections available, uncertainties on cost estimates of Kyoto emission reductions diverge by a factor of about 500
(and not all estimates show an economic loss) whereas trends in global temperature diverge by a factor of about 4 (but all indicate a warming trend). Statistically speaking, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation 10 indicate, in a normalised form, how large the uncertainties are for each set of scenarios and for all scenarios taken together. Such results
showing very large uncertainties on costs estimates should encourage inquiry into and communication on economic uncertainties in at least as much as is done for scientific uncertainties.
9 The cost estimates for the USA depend on several factors explained in details in EIA (1998) and also commented in Lasky (2003) , Barker and Ekins (2004) and Fisher and Mogernstern (2005) . The point here is not to describe the reason for uncertainties but just to evaluate the level of uncertainty.
10 That is, the standard deviation divided by the mean and multiplied by 100.
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The White House and the Kyoto Protocol: Double standards on uncertainties and their consequences Lasky (2003) The $400 billion figure 11 is significantly higher than the highest estimate on total cost found in the peer-reviewed literature published in Weyant et al. (1999) . Supposedly, the figure derived from a particular scenario that did not take into account the substantial cost It is however misleading to say that it would cost 400 billion US$ in 2010 to the US economy because the way the cost impacts the economy is in fact much more complex than a direct cost immediately imputed to the GDP of the year considered. The net economic cost does indeed depend to a large extent on how the revenue of the emissions reduction policy is being recycled into the national economy. The EIA (1998) report includes a scenario where some type of revenue recycling is being considered and under that scenario, the overall cost drops to from 4.2% to 1.9% of GDP in 2010; the annual growth loss is then estimated as 0.4% instead of 0.8% in the Kyoto scenario without revenue recycling. It is very unfortunate that the results of this last scenario, although issued in the same study and with identical emission reductions targets, were not mentioned in the President's address.
Beyond this discussion of cost evaluation, in all cases the estimates of growth loss need to be interpreted in the right context. In the EIA 1998 growth scenario, the US economy would grow by 36% between 1996 and 2010. Would a growth of 31.8% instead, under the most pessimistic of the EIA scenarios, have wrecked the US economy? Current data and projections (EIA, 2006) show that over the period 1998-2012 the US GDP is likely to grow by 51 %. This means that over the same period, a scenario where in 2010 the GDP would be 4.2% lower would have implied an average annual growth rate of 2.67% instead of 3.03% in the reference case. Put this way, even the misleading high cost estimate given for the cost of Kyoto would not have done much harm to the US economy.
Few papers in the economic literature specify how cost estimates are being distributed over time. Most papers give an annual cost but fail to specify over which period the cost is 12
The White House and the Kyoto Protocol: Double standards on uncertainties and their consequences being felt. However, time distribution of this cost matters. If the total cost of meeting the Kyoto Protocol target is imputed to the five year commitment period, it is very likely to be higher than if that cost were distributed over a longer period with early mitigation action taken. This is simply because of the well known differences between short run and long run costs. Allowing for time allows for cost saving adjustments that are hardly negligible.
Evidence of cost savings associated with early action are reported in the literature Barker and Ekins (2004) and Kallbekken and Rive (2005) . Again, providing precise information on how costs would be distributed over time would have improved the understanding of the nature of the issues involved.
In his lucid book, DeCanio (2003) The evolution of cost estimates expressed in percentage of GDP loss as published since 1999 is summarized in Table 4 . Because complying with the Kyoto Protocol is, policywise, an outdated issue in the US, modelling projections on the cost of the Kyoto Protocol in the US has, to our best knowledge, no longer been undertaken since the study of Manne and Richels (2001) and Krause et al. (2002) . This is unfortunate because, should this
The White House and the Kyoto Protocol: Double standards on uncertainties and their consequences reassessment be made today, with the Protocol finalised as in the Marrakech Accords of 2001 and the subsequent Climate Conference of the Parties decisions (that is, accounting with multi-gas emission reduction programmes, carbon uptake in forests, updated knowledge on marginal abatement costs and trading benefits), it is very likely that the overall cost estimate projected, with the same set of models as used in the late nineties, would be much lower than previously foreseen. And, equally likely, the uncertainty margins of the estimates would be significantly reduced -if they had been stated. 
2. Climate model-based studies
A few years ago, when climate modellers noticed that their models tended to overestimate global warming because the aerosols representation was missing in their models (Mitchell and Johns, 1997) , climate models were modified to take that phenomenon into account. New simulations results were compared to the most recent data sets available to 
New data
With the implementation of emission reduction programmes (voluntary or mandatory) in various part of the world, including the US, large sets of data on observed costs are made available and could be used for a better validation of the results of the economic models.
The information so obtained is sometimes surprising. Thus, from the industry sector, - (Brown, 2004) In Europe, the factual data that emerge from the recently implemented carbon market are as follows. On the carbon credit market, credits are exchanged between 10 and 33 $/ton The size of the market (in terms of the amount of credits traded) as well as its liquidity are insufficient for the recorded prices to reflect marginal abatement costs accurately. Moreover, the link between the European carbon credit market and the world market for Kyoto-based projects is also not yet in place (Lecocq and Capoor, 2005) . When a sufficiently large and liquid market will operate, the current EU carbon credit market prices might change significantly. It is thus premature to conclude that the higher figures will keep prevailing.
The emerging data showing real costs should help in assessing the affordability of emission policies even in the Kyoto context. They should also assist economic modellers in better validating their forecasting tools. Figure 4 illustrates the carbon prices in the US and the GDP impact of implementing Kyoto as projected in the studies referred to in this review.
Although no direct comparison of the carbon price with observed carbon prices can be made, the orders of magnitude are indicative of the range of uncertainties, among projections and between model outputs and observations.
There are precedents of overestimation of the cost of emission reduction programmes by economic models, the most conspicuous one being the case of SO 2 emission reductions in the US. In the case of SO 2 , the overestimation was considerable, as evidenced by Joskow et al., 2000 . Smith et al. (1998 warn on how cautious one should be when comparing costs estimates with allowance prices and on the limits of such comparisons.
Another example seems to be the implementation of the Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting substances. No systematic assessment of the overall cost of the Montreal Protocol implementation has been done, to the best of our knowledge. However, evidence in the direction of costs overestimation is provided by DeCanio (2003, p. 146-147) Of course, the case of GHG is different and the causes for a potential overestimation of abatement costs programmes are likely not to be the same. However, because of the The White House and the Kyoto Protocol: Double standards on uncertainties and their consequences precedents just mentioned, the hypothesis of an overestimation of GHG emission reduction costs deserves close scrutiny.
Summary and Conclusion
The two quotations given at the beginning of this paper illustrate interpretations by politicians can differ on economic assessments, even when they belong to the same party.
Such opposite views are, at best, a qualitative indicator of the uncertainties associated with the cost assessment of GHG emission reductions.
In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the message conveyed by the White House was only that implementing the Protocol would cost 400 billion US$ per year by 2012 and that such cost would be harmful to the economy. We show that these figures of costs estimates were based on outdated scenarios, higher than the highest estimate available in the literature, and that the figures were not accompanied by appropriate information for a proper interpretation.
One may therefore plausibly think that such biased messages conveyed to the media and the public have played a role in gaining popular support for the US rejection of the Protocol in
2001.
This review also shows that scientific evidence from economic modelling exercises performed to date does not show that the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would have "wrecked" the US economy. Data and studies recently made available show that some of the published estimates have entailed large overestimations of the costs.
Since communicating deliberately high cost estimates obviously has political effects, researchers in this context should insist upon systematically communicating the uncertainty ranges on projected estimates and on explaining how the results should be interpreted.
Economic modelling researchers in this field should take advantage of the experience acquired by climate science modellers. Systematic backcasting exercises (Schwartz et al., 2002) and ensemble simulations (Murphy et al, 2004) instead of a few model runs are current practice in climate modelling that may be relevant to assessing uncertainties in economic modelling. The use of similar tools for uncertainty analysis in climate and economic modelling would not only contribute to knowledge gains, it would also greatly facilitate the communication of uncertainties to decision makers 16 .
Preparing and publishing revised assessments of the cost to the US of implementing the Kyoto Protocol is not only a matter of good scientific practice: it would also have an important impact on developing countries who also fear the burden of costs and tend to use the same argument as the US to postpone discussions on action from their side.
Politically, a major shift in US international policy on climate change under this presidency remains unlikely. Scientifically however, a better acknowledgment of the uncertainties associated with cost estimates of GHG emission reductions would give the economic estimates an increased credibility. Such improvement would be helpful to the worldwide policy process currently under way.
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